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1 
The Relationships between Intelligence and Consciousness 
in Natural and Artificial Systems 
David Gamez 
Department of Computer Science, Middlesex University, London, NW4 4BT, UK 
d.gamez@mdx.ac.uk 
This paper explores some of the potential connections between natural and artificial intelligence and 
natural and artificial consciousness. In humans we use batteries of tests to indirectly measure 
intelligence. This approach breaks down when we try to apply it to radically different animals and to 
the many varieties of artificial intelligence. To address this issue people are starting to develop 
algorithms that can measure intelligence in any type of system. Progress is also being made in the 
scientific study of consciousness: we can neutralize the philosophical problems, we have data about 
the neural correlates and we have some idea about how we can develop mathematical theories that 
can map between physical and conscious states. While intelligence is a purely functional property of 
a system, there are good reasons for thinking that consciousness is linked to particular 
spatiotemporal patterns in specific physical materials. This paper outlines some of the weak 
inferences that can be made about the relationships between intelligence and consciousness in 
natural and artificial systems. To make real scientific progress we need to develop practical universal 
measures of intelligence and mathematical theories of consciousness that can reliably map between 
physical and conscious states. 
Keywords: Intelligence; Consciousness; Artificial intelligence; AI; Measure of intelligence; IQ; g-
score; Artificial consciousness; Prediction.
1. Introduction 
Intelligence is a complex multifaceted term and many overlapping definitions have been 
put forward. These include cognitive ability, rational thinking, problem solving and goal-
directed adaptive behavior [Bartholomew, 2004]. Most people believe that intelligence is 
some kind of general ability to think, understand and solve problems. It has also been 
claimed that there are multiple types of intelligence [Gardner, 2006] and that intelligence 
is a high-dimensional space of abilities [Warwick, 2000]. In humans intelligence is 
usually regarded as some kind of aptitude or capacity for learning and solving new 
problems, rather than an ability to remember stored knowledge. This distinction between 
a capacity for learning and solving new problems and the reproduction of previous 
knowledge has been formalized as a distinction between fluid and crystallized 
intelligence [Cattell, 1971]. Modern intelligence tests are typically designed to measure 
fluid intelligence: a person’s capacity to solve new problems regardless of their previous 
education and environment.  
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Intelligence cannot be directly measured. The first part of Section 2 summarizes the 
large amount of work that has been done on the indirect inference of intelligence using 
written and aural tests of people’s verbal, mathematical and spatial reasoning abilities. 
The results of these tests are typically converted into IQ or g-score values.  It is difficult 
to use a test-based approach to measure the intelligence of animals and it fails completely 
when we try to use it to measure intelligence in machines. To address this issue a number 
of people have developed universal measures of intelligence that can be applied to 
humans, animals and artificial systems. Regardless of the way that we measure it, 
intelligence is a functional quality of a system. The details of a system’s implementation 
of intelligence have no effect on the amount of intelligence that is attributed to the 
system. 
After the demise of behaviorism there was a renaissance of interest in consciousness. 
Progress has been made with the philosophical problems and solid scientific research has 
been carried out on the neural correlates of consciousness. Some empirically oriented 
theories of consciousness have been developed – for example, global workspace theory 
[Baars, 1988] and the information integration theory of consciousness [Oizumi et al., 
2014]. We are also starting to develop a clearer vision about how we can use 
mathematical theories of consciousness to map between descriptions of consciousness 
and descriptions of the physical world [Gamez, 2018]. This type of theory would be 
developed and tested on humans and then we could use it to make believable predictions 
about the consciousness of animals and machines. Section 3 introduces this work on 
consciousness and then Section 4 discusses why consciousness cannot be solely linked to 
computations, functions or information patterns in the physical brain. Consciousness 
must be tied to particular spatiotemporal patterns in specific physical substrates: a system 
cannot be conscious purely because it is executing a particular function. Artificial 
consciousness has also made rapid progress in recent years and a substantial amount of 
theoretical and empirical research has been carried out in this area (see Section 5). 
Section 6 discusses the relationship between intelligence and consciousness in 
natural systems. It is likely that the functions that implement intelligence overlap with the 
functions that implement consciousness in biological systems. The spatial and temporal 
complexity of a system’s consciousness are also likely to be weakly connected to its 
intelligence.  With artificial systems, progress in artificial intelligence is likely to lead to 
AI systems that exhibit more conscious human behaviors, and models of consciousness 
and models of the correlates of consciousness could be used to build more intelligent 
machines (see Section 7). The relationship between AI and artificial phenomenal 
consciousness can only be properly studied when we have a practical universal 
intelligence measure and a mathematical theory of consciousness that can generate 
believable predictions about the consciousness of machines. 
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2. Measures of Intelligence 
Intelligence is not a precisely defined property, like mass or charge, and it cannot be 
directly measured People recognize intelligent behavior and rank people according to 
their intelligence, but we cannot point to the intelligence in a brain and we cannot 
program general intelligence into a machine. To address this issue people often use 
batteries of behavioral tests to measure intelligence and there have been attempts to 
formulate universal measures of intelligence. 
Over the last hundred years there has been a large amount of work on the indirect 
measurement of intelligence through tests that measure behavioral characteristics judged 
to be linked to intelligence. In the early days these tests included significant numbers of 
questions based on factual knowledge (crystallized intelligence). Modern human 
intelligence tests are now mostly based on verbal reasoning, spatial manipulation and 
mathematics. The results from these tests can be treated as raw scores, but they are 
typically converted into values of intelligence quotient (IQ) or g-score. To calculate IQ 
you take the test results from a sample of the population and calculate the mean and 
standard deviation. The mean score is assigned an IQ of 100 and each standard deviation 
above and below the mean corresponds to 15 IQ points. The resulting IQ score can be 
used to rank individuals according to how well they perform on a battery of intelligence 
tests. IQ is a population derived measure that does not correspond to a property of a 
particular individual. 
Within the scientific community intelligence test results are often analyzed for 
factors that explain the relationships between the test results. Studies have shown that 
factors related to specific cognitive abilities – for example, reasoning, memory, and 
processing speed – can explain the results of closely related tests, and these factors are, in 
turn, linked to a single underlying factor, g, which is thought to correspond to 
intelligence. Like intelligence, g cannot be directly measured, so the test results are 
expressed as a g-score. Measures of IQ and g-score are controversial and they have often 
been misused. However, they have played a valuable role in scientific research on 
intelligence and they can be an effective way of pre-processing large numbers of 
applicants for jobs, education or the military.  
The measurement of intelligence through a battery of tests has some plausibility with 
humans, since we generally agree about which behaviors are linked to intelligence. 
However, it becomes much more problematic when we want to compare the intelligence 
of different species. Most animals cannot take human intelligence tests, so there has been 
some work on the development of cognitive test batteries in animals [Shaw & Schmelz, 
2017]. It might be possible to come up with a plausible set of tests that could be applied 
to similar animals, but this approach is likely to neglect the different types of intelligence 
that animals develop to survive in their ecological niche. A measure of intelligence that is 
designed for sheep or fish, for example, cannot easily be transferred to birds or bees. For 
example, suppose we want to develop a test that compares human and pigeon 
intelligence. We could include mathematical abilities and spatial reasoning in our tests, 
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which might be common to both. But pigeons have a greater capacity to map and 
navigate through their environment, so should this be included in the test as well? As our 
test battery expands with each species we will end up with a very ad-hoc collection, with 
each animal scoring well on the tests that are specific to its own set of abilities. It seems 
highly unlikely that we will be able to design a single set of cognitive tests that would 
enable us to meaningfully compare intelligence across all species. These problems 
become even more acute when we attempt to measure intelligence in machines and try to 
compare the intelligence of natural and artificial systems. A computer that was 
programmed to outperform humans on IQ tests could be completely incapable of 
performing any other task that we consider to be intelligent. It is likely to be impossible 
to use batteries of behavioral tests to compare human and machine intelligence. 
One approach to this problem is to give up on the idea of a meaningful set of tests to 
measure intelligence across all animals and possible machines. Instead, we can take 
humans as our benchmark and rank animals and machines according to the extent to 
which they match or exceed human intelligence. This is a form of Turing testing. A 
different response to this problem is to develop more abstract definitions and tests of 
intelligence that enable humans to be compared with other species and artificial systems. 
An influential example of this approach was put forward by Legg and Hutter [2007], who 
defined intelligence as the ability of an agent to achieve goals in different environments. 
The total intelligence of the agent is the sum of the reward that an agent achieves across 
all possible environments with some adjustment made for the complexity of different 
environments. This measure has some intuitive plausibility, but it is not practically 
calculable because it sums across all possible actions of the agent and across all possible 
environments. A more practical goal/reward based measure of intelligence has been 
proposed by Hernandez-Orallo and Dowe [2010]. 
In my own work I have been developing a measure of intelligence based on a 
system’s ability to make predictions. Many behaviors linked to intelligence, such as 
spatial, mathematical and verbal reasoning, require prediction, and our ability to succeed 
in a variety of environments is closely tied to our ability to predict the consequences of 
our actions in different environments. A predictive approach to intelligence also fits in 
well with the recent surge of interest in the predictive brain hypothesis [Clark, 2016]. If 
brains are intelligent and the brain’s core function is prediction, then brains that are better 
predictors will be more intelligent. The recent successes of artificial intelligence have 
also been largely based on the ability of machine learning algorithms to generate 
predictions. Predictive ability can be measured through external tests and I am 
developing an algorithm that will measure a system’s predictive intelligence from its 
internal states. 
There has been a substantial amount of research on the neuroscience of intelligence 
[Haier, 2017]. This might enable us to measure intelligence more directly and accurately 
in humans – for example, using a brain scanner instead of a battery of tests. However, 
intelligence is likely to be implemented in different ways in cephalopods and birds, which 
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have very different brain architectures, and this approach fails completely when it is 
applied to artificial systems that use different mechanisms to generate external behavior.  
In all of this work on the definition and measurement of intelligence, intelligence is 
treated as a purely functional property. Biological and artificial systems are, in principle, 
capable of the same level of intelligence and the specific details of the implementation of 
intelligence has no consequences for the amount of intelligence that is attributed to a 
system. 
3. Consciousness 
I define consciousness as a bubble of experience [Gamez, 2018]. When we are conscious 
we are immersed in a bubble of space, roughly centered on our bodies, within which 
objects and non-physical properties, such as color and smell, are distributed. My bubble 
of experience currently contains green trees and I smell coffee on my desk. When I am at 
the beach my bubble of experience contains white sand, blue sea and the taste of tequila. 
In online perception objects and properties in our bubbles of experience co-vary with the 
physical world. We can also change our conscious experiences offline, independently of 
the world, in dreams and imagination. 
Bubbles of experience have multiple dimensions of variation. The spatial size of 
bubbles of experience can vary, there is variation in temporal depth [Husserl, 1964] and 
there can be more or less objects and properties and more or less types of objects and 
properties. The contents of bubbles of experience can also appear with different levels of 
intensity. In dreams, imagination and on the edges of sleep contents are vague, washed 
out and unstable. In online perception contents are vivid and stable with rich colors. A 
person on hallucinogenic drugs can have experiences with greater intensity than the 
normal waking state. The contents of a single experience can have range of intensities. 
There might be a fleeting impression of a bird at the edge of my field of vision while I am 
looking at a bright red bus rushing towards me and experiencing intense feelings of fear 
and panic. 
There are challenging philosophical problems with consciousness, such as the hard 
problem and the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. Elsewhere I 
have shown how our modern concept of consciousness (and some of its problems) co-
evolved with the development of modern scientific theories about the physical world. I 
have also proposed a minimal set of assumptions that can neutralize the philosophical 
problems with consciousness and provide a solid foundation for its scientific study 
[Gamez, 2018].  
Over the last thirty years there has been some solid scientific work on the neural 
correlates of consciousness. This has measured consciousness, measured brain states and 
looked for correlations between the two [Koch et al., 2016]. Promising data has been 
gathered, but, as Popper [2002] points out, scientific theories are ultimately not going to 
be long lists of correlations between consciousness and the physical world. We need to 
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develop a compact mathematical theory that describes the relationship between 
measurements of conscious states and measurements of physical states. This 
mathematical theory would convert a description of a conscious state into a description of 
a physical state and vice versa, and it should be applicable to both biological and artificial 
systems. One of the challenges with developing such a theory is that we need to find an 
appropriate way of describing consciousness that is applicable to both humans and 
machines. There are also issues with the amount of data that would need to be processed 
to develop and test such a theory. The latter problem could potentially be addressed using 
machine learning and other AI techniques that have been used in computational scientific 
discovery [Dzeroski & Todorovski, 2007]. 
4. Physical, Computational, Functional and Informational Theories of 
Consciousness  
A physical theory of consciousness links consciousness to particular spatiotemporal 
physical patterns. These could be neural patterns or a pattern in a property of firing 
neurons, such as electromagnetic waves [Pockett, 2000]. Quantum theories also fit into 
this category [Hameroff & Penrose, 1996]. In this type of theory consciousness is not just 
linked to a particular spatiotemporal pattern, but to a spatiotemporal pattern in a 
particular physical material. This is similar to other scientific theories: a moving electron 
produces a magnetic field; a moving neutron does not. 
Many people believe that consciousness is linked to computations or functions 
[Cleeremans, 2005]. They claim that consciousness is present wherever a particular 
computation or function is executed, independently of how the computation or function is 
implemented. For example, people have connected consciousness with the 
implementation of a global workspace [Dehaene, 2014]. Information integration theory 
connects particular patterns of information to consciousness, independently of the 
physical implementation of the information [Tononi, 2008]. 
Physical and computational/functional theories of consciousness have some common 
ground. It might be the case that global workspace theory, for example, captures a certain 
kind of pattern, which is linked to consciousness when it is implemented in a particular 
way in a biological brain. However, computational and functional theories of 
consciousness lose plausibility when the claim is made that a computation or function is 
linked to consciousness independently of the material in which the computation or 
function is realized. One problem with this claim is that a system executing a computer 
program is just a sequence of physical states. There is nothing special about this sequence 
of physical states (that is the whole point of separating the computation from the physical 
implementation). So any sequence of physical states can be interpreted as implementing a 
particular run of a given computation [Putnam, 1988; Bishop, 2009]. This leads to an 
implausible panpsychism and to the untenable result that every brain is associated with an 
infinite number of different consciousnesses.  
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A second problem with computational/functional theories of consciousness is that 
they can only be scientifically tested if we have an objective way of measuring the 
presence or absence of a computation or function in a system. For example, to prove that 
global workspace theory is correct, we need to be able to determine whether there is an 
active global workspace in the conscious brain and show that no global workspaces are 
being executed in the unconscious brain. Unfortunately we do not have a way of 
unambiguously measuring the computations or functions that are being executed in a 
physical system [Gamez, 2014]. Information integration theory has similar problems with 
the subjectivity of information and with the measurement of information in a system 
[Gamez, 2016]. The only reasonable conclusion is that computations, functions and 
information are subjective - not objectively measureable properties of physical systems. 
5. Artificial Consciousness 
Artificial consciousness has been extensively discussed and working systems have been 
built to explore different aspects of this topic. We are now seeing the re-launch of an 
academic journal dedicated to artificial consciousness and the public awareness of this 
topic has been raised through films, such as Chappie and Ex Machina, and Netflix series, 
such as Altered Carbon and Black Mirror [Gamez, 2020]. 
Artificial consciousness is a complicated field that can be broken down into at least 
four overlapping areas [Gamez, 2018]: 
 MC1. Machines with the same external behavior as conscious systems. Humans 
behave in particular ways when they are conscious. For example, they are alert, they 
can respond to novel situations, they can inwardly execute sequences of problem-
solving steps and they can learn. MC1 machine consciousness is the creation of AI 
systems that exhibit some or all of these external behaviors. Watson [Ferrucci, 2012] 
is an example of a MC1 system that mimics the external behavior of conscious 
humans when they are playing Jeopardy. 
 MC2. Models of the correlates of consciousness. Theories about the neural and 
functional correlates of consciousness in humans can be modeled in a computer. For 
example, global workspace implementations have been used to control a naval 
dispatching system [Franklin, 2003] and a video game avatar [Gamez et al., 2013]. 
 MC3. Models of consciousness. Phenomenal experiences have characteristic features 
that can be modeled in computers and used to control robots. One example of this type 
of system was developed by Chella et al. [2007], who used a virtual environment 
(analogous to the robot’s consciousness) to control a museum guide robot. Marques 
and Holland [2009] built a system in which a robot used a simulation of itself to solve 
a motor control problem and executed the solution with its real body. 
 MC4. Machines that are phenomenally conscious. When humans are conscious they 
are immersed in a bubble of experience that contains colors, smells, sounds, etc. A 
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machine that was immersed in a bubble of experience that contained something similar 
to our colors, smells and sounds would be MC4 conscious. MC4 consciousness will 
only be fully solved when we have discovered a mathematical theory of consciousness 
that can reliably map between physical and conscious states. We have no idea whether 
any of our current machines are MC4 conscious.  
These categories are not exclusive: systems can implement several of them at the same 
time. For example, a robot based on the neural correlates of consciousness (MC2) could 
be phenomenally conscious (MC4) and exhibit conscious external behavior (MC1). 
6. Natural Intelligence and Natural Consciousness 
Intelligence is purely functional property of a system and its components – the amount of 
intelligence in a system is independent of the way in which the intelligence is 
implemented. In Section 4 I outlined good reasons for thinking that consciousness must 
be linked to particular spatiotemporal patterns in specific physical materials. Intelligence 
and consciousness can overlap in a system when the implementation of the intelligence 
functions produces spatiotemporal physical patterns (for example, neuron firing patterns) 
that are correlated with consciousness. 
While there has been a substantial amount of work on the neuroscience of 
intelligence [Haier, 2017] and on the correlates of consciousness [Koch et al., 2016], we 
do not know enough about either to be able to say whether the brain’s implementation of 
the functions linked to intelligence are the same as the neural correlates of consciousness. 
The best that we can say is that some of the functions that have been proposed to be 
linked to consciousness in the brain are also likely to be linked to intelligence. For 
example, Aleksander and Dunmall [2003] claim that depiction, imagination, attention, 
planning and emotion are minimally necessary to support consciousness. These 
functional properties are clearly connected with intelligence – for example, we need 
imagination to do IQ tasks, such as Ravens’ matrices, and planning is related to 
predictive intelligence and goal achievement. Other people have hypothesized that the 
brain’s implementation of a global workspace is connected with its consciousness 
[Dehaene, 2014]. Global workspace theory has been shown to be good way to implement 
AI systems [Franklin, 2003; Gamez et al., 2013], so if global workspace theory is a 
correct theory of consciousness, then the brain’s implementation of a global workspace is 
likely to be linked to its intelligence. While the exact relationship between prediction and 
consciousness is an open question, there is clearly a lot of non-conscious prediction going 
on in the brain, so there is unlikely to be a close match between the brain’s predictive 
abilities and its consciousness. More abstract theories about consciousness, such as 
higher order thought [Rosenthal, 1986], recurrent processing [Maia & Cleeremans, 2005] 
and information integration theory [Tononi, 2008] point to brain mechanisms that might 
also be involved in intelligence. For example, a brain that can integrate more information 
(possibly using recurrent connections) and which contains meta-information about its 
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internal states is likely to be more intelligent. Intelligence can be implemented in many 
different ways, so there is unlikely to be a strong relationship between the spatiotemporal 
patterns linked to consciousness and the intelligence functionality of the brain. 
Weak inferences can also be made from phenomenological observations about 
consciousness to the potential intelligence of a system. This connection is weak because 
most of the data and functions that produce intelligence are not consciously experienced. 
For example, when an insight spontaneously appears to me I typically lack insight into 
the exact mechanisms by which it was arrived at, presumably because it was the result of 
unconscious processing. However, some of our reasoning is carried out consciously using 
imagination. With this type of reasoning, a consciousness with more contents could 
potentially solve more problems, achieve more goals and generate more predictions. So 
we might have weak grounds for believing that a system with more conscious contents 
has greater potential for intelligence. This is only a weak inference because there could 
be systems with rich states of consciousness that are not capable of intelligent behavior, 
and an impoverished binary consciousness, which could only contain a 1 or 0, could 
potentially write every single document that has ever been created by humans. While the 
intensity of conscious contents plays a role in tagging states as online or offline, this does 
not appear to be strongly linked to intelligence. 
7. Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Consciousness 
The relationship between artificial intelligence and artificial consciousness varies with 
the type of artificial consciousness that is under discussion. 
MC1 machine consciousness focuses on machines that behave in a similar way to 
conscious humans. Many external behaviors linked to consciousness are also linked to 
intelligence and most of the behaviors that we judge to be intelligent in humans can only 
be carried out consciously. So there is likely to be a close relationship between progress 
in MC1 machine consciousness and progress in artificial intelligence. As machines mimic 
more human behaviors, they will appear to be more conscious and more intelligent. 
However, there is also a potential dissociation between MC1 machine consciousness and 
AI. Machines could implement forms of intelligence that achieve low g-scores on human 
test batteries, but score highly on universal measures of intelligence. These highly 
intelligent machines might not exhibit any conscious human behaviors. 
MC2 and MC3 machine consciousness research uses models of the correlates of 
consciousness and models of consciousness to produce more intelligent machines. This 
has already led to the development of systems that exhibit human-like intelligence 
[Gamez et al., 2013] and general intelligence [Chella et al., 2007] and MC2 and MC3 
research is likely to contribute to the increase in both forms of artificial intelligence in the 
future. However, AI is a very diverse field and MC2 and MC3 are only two ways of 
building intelligent machines. A large number of other AI approaches, such as deep 
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neural networks, can be used to develop intelligent systems, and these have few 
connections to research on consciousness. 
We know almost nothing about the MC4 consciousness of artificial systems. It is 
possible that some of our current AI systems have conscious states that are as rich and 
vivid as our own. It is also possible that consciousness is only linked to systems that 
implement certain functions in something approximating to biological hardware. Since 
consciousness is not a purely functional property and a given piece of intelligent behavior 
can be implemented in an infinite number of different ways [Putnam, 1988], there is not a 
necessary connection or nomological law linking intelligence and MC4 consciousness. 
The amount of overlap between MC4 machine consciousness and AI is an empirical 
question that can only be answered we have a reliable mathematical theory of 
consciousness and a practical universal measure of intelligence that does not depend on 
batteries of anthropocentric tests. 
8. Conclusions 
Progress has been made with the measurement of intelligence in natural systems and 
many scientists believe that g-score reliably measures intelligence in humans and some 
animals. However, the test battery approach that is used to measure g-score is unlikely to 
be generalizable to the wide variety of behaviors and intelligences in artificial systems. 
One solution to this problem is to design tests that only measure human-like intelligence - 
in the AI context this is a version of Turing testing. Another approach is to design 
universal intelligence measures that can be applied to any system at all, such as Legg and 
Hutter’s [2007] goal/reward based test or the prediction based measure that I am 
developing. 
While there is still considerable philosophical controversy about consciousness, 
many of the philosophical problems can be neutralized with assumptions that provide a 
reasonable starting point for the scientific study of consciousness [Gamez, 2018]. 
Scientific research on the correlates of consciousness has made considerable progress and 
several theories about the functional and informational correlates of consciousness have 
been put forward, such as global workspace theory and information integration. These 
theories might be good ways of specifying the neural patterns that are linked to 
consciousness. However, computations, functions and information are not objective 
properties of the physical world, so they cannot be linked to consciousness independently 
of the way in which they are implemented in a particular physical material. 
Intelligence is a purely functional property; consciousness is not, so there cannot be a 
strong connection between consciousness and the many different ways in which 
intelligence can be implemented in artificial and natural systems. In natural systems, the 
spatiotemporal physical patterns linked to consciousness might be closely linked to the 
brain’s implementation of intelligence. Weak inferences can also be made from the 
richness and structure of natural consciousness to the potential intelligence of a system. 
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In artificial systems there is a reasonably close connection between the development of 
machines that exhibit human-like intelligent behavior and the development of MC1 
machines. MC2 and MC3 research is likely to contribute to the development of more 
intelligent machines. 
At the present time we do not have the theories or the data that are required to make 
stronger conclusions about the relationship between intelligence and consciousness. We 
will be able to systematically study this relationship when we have a practical universal 
measure of intelligence that can be applied to natural and artificial systems and a reliable 
mathematical theory of consciousness that can map between descriptions of physical and 
conscious states. 
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